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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
The Virgin Islands police arrested appellee Alex Hodge 
after he discarded two bags of crack cocaine while fleeing 
from police. Following the arrest and based on the affidavit 
of officer Samuel Abraham, the police obtained a search 
warrant for Hodge's residence. Hodge moved to suppress 
the evidence obtained during execution of the warrant, 
arguing that Abraham's affidavit failed to establish a 
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sufficient nexus between Hodge's criminal activity and his 
home. The District Court of the Virgin Islands granted 
Hodge's motion and the United States appealed. W e hold 
that the affidavit supporting the warrant pr ovided a 
substantial basis for finding probable cause to search 
Hodge's residence. Alternatively, wefind that the officers 
who executed the search relied on the warrant in objective 
good faith. Accordingly, we reverse the or der suppressing 




As the outcome of this case hinges on the sufficiency of 
the affidavit supporting the warrant, the underlying facts 
are largely taken from that affidavit. When the affidavit was 
executed, Abraham, the affiant, had been a detective with 
the Virgin Islands Police for seven years. Appendix at 187 
(App.). During the previous three years, Abraham had been 
assigned to the High Intensity Drug Traffic Area Task Force 
on St. Croix (HIDTA). Id. Abraham had "participated in 
numerous investigations related to nar cotics trafficking." Id. 
 
On July 18, 1999, a confidential informant, who had 
previously "provided accurate and r eliable information 
regarding criminal activity in St. Cr oix," informed a member 
of the HIDTA "that Alex Hodge was scheduled to make a 
delivery of crack cocaine on King Street, Fr ederiksted, St. 
Croix in the vicinity of [a particular stor e] at mid-day on 
July 19, 1999." Id. On July 19, 1999, Abraham and other 
members of the HIDTA were stationed on King Street near 
the identified store "and observed Hodge exit a blue Mazda 
Protege and approach another individual" who was a known 
drug user. Id. at 187-88. "As he approached this individual 
Hodge" reached into the front "of his pants as if he were 
trying to retrieve something." Id. at 188. Abraham knew 
that sellers often store drugs in the fr ont of their pants to 
conceal the drugs from law enforcement. Id. 
 
Hodge fled when he saw the HIDTA agents. Id. The agents 
observed that Hodge had "what appeared to be a plastic 
sandwich bag in his" hand and that he dropped the bag 
near a trash can. Id. The agents appr ehended Hodge and 
located two sandwich bags containing what appear ed to be 
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approximately 1/8 to 1/4 kilogram of crack cocaine near 
the trash can. Id. Hodge was arrested on the spot. Id. 
 
A member of the HIDTA team knew that Hodge r esided in 
a home behind, but not attached to, the home at Number 
48 White Bay, in the same city as the anticipated 
transaction--Frederiksted, St. Croix. Id. The agent also 
knew that Hodge drove a red Acura Integra as well as a 
rented, blue Mazda Protege. Id. HIDTA agents went to 
Hodge's suspected home and saw the red Integra parked 
there. Agents were also told by a r esident of Number 48 
that Hodge lived in the home behind Number 48. Id. at 
188-89. 
 
Based on this information, Abraham averr ed that Hodge 
resided in the home behind Number 48. Id.  at 189. 
Abraham also averred that "[t]he quantity of cocaine 
involved in [Hodge's] attempted transaction and the 
circumstances surround[ing] his arr est indicate[d] that 
Hodge was possessing the crack cocaine with an intent to 
distribute it." Id. "Based upon [his] training and 
experience," Abraham stated that he knew "that persons 
involved in the receipt and distribution of controlled 
substances commonly keep within their residences evidence 
of their criminal activity." Id. 
 
Relying on Abraham's affidavit, a magistrate judge found 
probable cause to search Hodge's home. During the search, 
the police located approximately 600 grams of crack 
cocaine, over 30 grams of marijuana, a machine gun, and 
live ammunition. Hodge was indicted for possessing a 
firearm as a felon, possessing cocaine base with intent to 
distribute, and possessing cocaine base near a school, with 
intent to distribute. Prior to trial, Hodge successfully moved 
to suppress evidence seized during the sear ch of his 
residence. The suppression order must be reversed if (1) the 
affidavit provided a substantial basis forfinding probable 
cause to search Hodge's home or (2) the officers relied on 
the warrant in objective good faith. 
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In ruling on Hodge's motion to suppress, the District 
Court "did not question the facts contained in the affidavit" 
supporting the search warrant. United States v. Jones, 994 
F.2d 1051, 1055 (3d Cir. 1993). Accor dingly, this Court's 
review of the suppression order is plenary. Id. at 1055 & 
n.5; see also United States v. Conley, 4 F .3d 1200, 1204-05 
(3d Cir. 1993). The Court sits like a district court and must, 
like the district court, give great defer ence to the magistrate 
judge's probable cause determination. See United States v. 
Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1999); Conley, 4 F.3d at 
1205. 
 
A magistrate judge may find probable cause when, 
viewing the totality of the circumstances,"there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
238 (1983). This Court must uphold the finding if the 
affidavit on which it was based provided a substantial basis 
for finding probable cause. See id. at 236; Conley, 4 F.3d at 
1205; Jones, 994 F.2d at 1054, 1055. The Court need not 
determine whether probable cause actually existed, but 
only whether there was "a `substantial basis' for finding 
probable cause." Jones, 994 F .2d at 1054; see id. at 1055, 
1057. In making this determination, the Court confines 
itself "to the facts that were befor e the magistrate judge, 
i.e., the affidavit, and [does] not consider information from 
other portions of the record." Id.  at 1055. "[T]he resolution 
of doubtful or marginal cases in this ar ea should be largely 
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants." 
Id. at 1057-58 (quoting United States v. V entresca, 380 U.S. 




Hodge argues, and the District Court agr eed, that the 
affidavit failed to establish a nexus between Hodge's drug 
activity and Hodge's home and thus did not pr ovide a 
sufficient basis for probable cause to sear ch the home. 
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"[D]irect evidence linking the place to be searched to the 
crime is not required for the issuance of a search warrant." 
Conley, 4 F.3d at 1207. "Instead, probable cause can be, 
and often is, inferred by `considering the type of crime, the 
nature of the items sought, the suspect's opportunity for 
concealment and normal inferences about where a criminal 
might hide' " the fruits of his crime. Jones, 994 F.2d 1056 
(quoting United States v. Jackson, 756 F .2d 703, 705 (9th 
Cir. 1985)). A court "is entitled to draw reasonable 
inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based 
on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense." 
United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 296 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting United States v. Caicedo, 85 F .3d 1184, 1192 (6th 
Cir. 1996)). 
 
In the present case, there is no dir ect evidence that drugs 
or drug paraphernalia would be located at Hodge's home. 
However, there was significant evidence from which the 
magistrate judge might reach that conclusion. Initially, the 
facts surrounding Hodge's arrest suggest that he was an 
experienced drug dealer who was operating a drug 
business. Cf. Whitner, 219 F.3d at 298. The amount of 
crack cocaine Hodge possessed indicated that he was 
"involved in selling drugs, rather than mer ely using them." 
Id. The fact that an informant, whose tip was corroborated 
by what actually happened, told the police that Hodge 
would be delivering cocaine at a particular time and 
location suggests both that Hodge's drug activities were 
organized and that Hodge was sufficiently involved in the 
drug trade that others knew of his activities. The 
prearranged nature of Hodge's dealing is likewise 
manifested by the fact that a known drug user was pr esent 
to meet Hodge at the time of the anticipated transaction. 
That Hodge appeared to carry the drugs in the front of his 
pants as is common to avoid detection also suggests that 
he had experience in the drug trade. Finally, Hodge's use of 
a rental car, another common practice in the drug trade, 
indicates that the anticipated transaction was not an 
isolated deal, but part of a larger business. See, e.g., United 
States v. $32,310.00, 1988 WL 169271, at *7 (D.N.J. June 
23, 1988) ("[E]vidence indicated that r ental cars are often 
used to facilitate drug transactions since such cars are not 
subject to forfeiture."). All these facts combine to suggest 
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that Hodge was an experienced and repeat drug dealer who 
would need to store evidence of his illicit activities 
somewhere. See Whitner, 219 F.3d at 298. 
 
It is reasonable to infer that a person involved in drug 
dealing on such a scale would store evidence of that dealing 
at his home. See id. at 297-98 (citing cases from other 
circuits); United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86-88 (1st Cir. 
1999) (finding "sufficient showing of pr obable cause" for 
search of "long-time, successful, drug trafficker[`s]" 
apartment, despite lack of direct evidence linking 
apartment to trafficking); United States v. McClellan, 165 
F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting"that in the case of 
drug dealers evidence is likely to be found wher e the 
dealers live") (quoting United States v. Reddrick, 90 F.3d 
1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis omitted); United 
States v. Thomas, 989 F.2d 1252, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per 
curiam) (upholding search of drug dealer's home and noting 
that "observations of illegal activity occurring away from the 
suspect's residence, can support a finding of probable 
cause to issue a search warrant for the r esidence, if there 
is a reasonable basis to infer from the nature of the illegal 
activity observed, that relevant evidence will be found in the 
residence"); United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 480, 481-82 
(4th Cir. 1992) (upholding search of known drug dealer's 
motel room despite lack of direct evidence that room was 
used in drug activities); cf. Jones, 994 F .2d at 1056 (cash, 
clothing, and firearms related to robbery were "the types of 
evidence likely to be kept in a suspect's residence"). A 
repeat drug dealer certainly has "the opportunity to conceal 
[drug-related evidence] in his home." Whitner, 219 F.3d at 
298. In addition, such a person "logically could conclude 
that his residence is the best, and probably the only, 
location to store items such as recor ds of illicit activity, 
phone books, address books, large amounts of cash, assets 
purchased with proceeds of drug transactions, guns to 
protect drugs and cash, and large quantities of drugs to be 
sold." Id. 
 
Hodge's home was in the same city where he was to 
make the anticipated drug delivery, rendering his home a 
more likely repository of his drug-r elated paraphernalia. Cf. 
Jones, 994 F.2d at 1057 ("[A]ll three defendants' homes 
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were on St. Croix and thus were r elatively near the site of 
the crime, making all of their homes a likely r epository for 
evidence."). Moreover, as Hodge concedes, probable cause 
existed to arrest him on drug-related char ges, Appellee's 
Brief at 12, again making it more likely that drug-related 
evidence would be stored at his home. See Jones, 994 F.2d 
at 1055-56 (While "probable cause to arr est does not 
automatically provide probable cause to search the 
arrestee's home," probable cause to arr est increases "the 
likelihood that [the arrestee's] r esidence contains evidence 
of the crime."); cf. Conley, 4 F.3d at 1207 (Previous arrests 
and convictions may help to establish probable cause.). 
 
Finally, Abraham, an experienced police officer , believed 
that Hodge's home would likely contain evidence r elated to 
Hodge's drug activities. The magistrate judge was entitled to 
"give considerable weight to the conclusions of[this] 
experienced law enforcement officer[ ] regarding where 
evidence of a crime [was] likely to be found." Whitner, 219 
F.3d at 296 (quoting Caicedo, 85 F .3d at 1192). 
 
The cumulative evidence outlined above provided a 
substantial basis from which to infer that a search of 
Hodge's home would yield evidence of Hodge's drug-r elated 
activities. To be sure, "it would have been preferable if 
[Abraham] could have supplied more infor mation linking 
[Hodge's home] to the criminal activity." Whitner, 219 F.3d 
at 299; see also Jones, 994 F.2d at 1057. Nonetheless, "the 
fact remains that he did bring the evidence . .. to a 
magistrate judge, who determined that ther e was probable 
cause to issue the warrant[ ]." Jones, 994 F.2d at 1057. "[A] 
`grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward 
warrants' is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's 
strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a 
warrant." Id. (quoting Ventr esca, 380 U.S. at 108). This 
preference for warrants further persuades us to hold that 
the magistrate judge had a substantial basis forfinding 
probable cause. 
 
III. Good Faith Exception 
 
Even if a substantial basis for finding pr obable cause 
were lacking, however, the evidence obtained through the 
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search would be admissible under the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 




The District Court found that the good faith exception did 
not apply in this case because Abraham's affidavit was so 
deficient as to render reliance on it unreasonable. We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court's conclusion. 
See Loy, 191 F.3d at 367 n.5; United States v. Williams, 3 




The good faith exception instructs that suppr ession of 
evidence "is inappropriate when an officer executes a 
search in objectively reasonable r eliance on a warrant's 
authority." Williams, 3 F.3d at 74. "The test for whether the 
good faith exception applies is `whether a r easonably well 
trained officer would have known that the sear ch was illegal 
despite the magistrate[ judge's] authorization.' " Loy, 191 
F.3d at 367 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). The mere 
existence of a warrant typically suffices to pr ove that an 
officer conducted a search in good faith and justifies 
application of the good faith exception. Leon , 468 U.S. at 
922; Williams, 3 F.3d at 74. Y et there are situations in 
which an officer's reliance on a warrant would not be 
reasonable and would not trigger the exception. Leon, 468 
U.S. at 922-23. Our Court has identified four such 
situations: 
 
       (1) [when] the magistrate [judge] issued the warrant in 
       reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit; 
 
       (2) [when] the magistrate [judge] abandoned his judicial 
       role and failed to perform his neutral and detached 
       function; 
 
       (3) [when] the warrant was based on an affidavit `so 
       lacking in indicia of probable cause as to r ender official 
       belief in its existence entirely unreasonable'; or 
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       (4) [when] the warrant was so facially deficient that it 
       failed to particularize the place to be sear ched or the 
       things to be seized. 
 
Williams, 3 F.3d at 74 n.4 (citations omitted). 
 
In the present case, Hodge makes no serious ar gument 
that the warrant was false,1 that the magistrate judge 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Hodge does argue that Abraham failed to include certain relevant facts 
in his affidavit; namely, that officers had"traveled to Hodge's residence 
after Hodge's arrest to inquire fr om [his neighbor] whether Hodge had 
been home prior to his arrest," that the officers were told that Hodge had 
been seen early in the morning, that the officers "entered Hodge's 
premises prior to obtaining the search warrant," and that the officers 
"misrepresented to [Hodge's neighbor] that Hodge's Mazda Protege had 
been stolen." Appellee's Brief at 18. The fact that officers traveled to 
Hodge's residence was disclosed in the affidavit. Failure to disclose the 
remaining facts does not render the affidavit misleading. 
 
Nor do any of the undisclosed facts undermine the magistrate judge's 
finding of probable cause. First, a r eviewing court "should focus not on 
what information an affidavit does not include [which may lead to 
improper de novo review], but rather on the information it does contain." 
Conley, 4 F.3d at 1208. Second, we do not agree with Hodge that his 
neighbor's statement that she saw him at home "early in the morning" 
would have undermined the showing of pr obable cause. Since the arrest 
occurred at about mid-day, the lapse of time between Hodge's spotting 
by his neighbor and his arrest was not gr eat. By showing that Hodge 
had been at home at most just a few hours befor e the arrest, the 
neighbor's statement might actually have bolster ed the showing of 
probable cause. Third, we do not agr ee with Hodge that the record shows 
that the officers entered his house befor e the warrant was issued. Hodge 
relies on his neighbor's affidavit. See App. at 176-77. In that affidavit, 
the neighbor first stated that the officers"approached" her and that, 
"[w]hile talking to the officers, I observed that they had made entry on 
to 
the premises and were looking around." Id. Two sentences later, she 
stated: "At approximately 3:00 p.m. the officers went into the house and 
began a search." Id. at 177. By far the most reasonable reading of the 
affidavit is that the officers' initial entry onto the "premises" 
consisted of 
their entering the property surrounding the house and that they did not 
actually enter the house until approximately 3:00 p.m., after the warrant 
had been issued. The neighbor did not testify at the suppression 
hearing, and no other witness testified that the officers illegally 
entered 
the house. Moreover, it is appar ent that none of the facts recited in the 
affidavit in support of the showing of probable cause were derived from 
an illegal entry into the house. Thus, the r eference in the neighbor's 
affidavit to the officers' initial entry onto the premises seems entirely 
inconsequential for present purposes. 
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abandoned his independent role, or that the warrant was 
fatally general. Instead, Hodge contends that the affidavit 
lacked the necessary indicia of probable cause. Specifically, 
Hodge asserts again that the affidavit failed to establish a 
sufficient nexus between Hodge's drug activity and his 
home. Hodge also asserts that Abraham knew of this 
deficiency and thus could not rely on the magistrate judge's 
finding of probable cause. 
 
As our probable cause analysis has already shown, 
Abraham's affidavit "was not a `bare bones' document" but 
contained sufficient indicia of probable cause to support a 
magistrate judge's finding of probable cause. Loy, 191 F.3d 
at 369. At a minimum, the affidavit was not clearly lacking 
in indicia of probable cause, but presented a close call. 
Once the magistrate judge made that call, it was objectively 
reasonable for the officers to rely on it. See Williams, 3 F.3d 
at 74. 
 
The officers' reliance on the warrant is further justified by 
the state of Circuit law at the time in question. As recently 
as July 2000, our Court, in United States v. Whitner, had 
declined to "decide whether the fact that [the defendant] 
appear[ed] to be a drug dealer [was] sufficient under the 
circumstances of [that] case to conclude that he would be 
likely to store evidence of his drug dealing at his residence." 
Whitner, 219 F.3d at 298; see also Jones, 994 F.2d at 1056 
(declining "to decide whether in every case the fact that a 
suspect committed a crime involving cash and/or a gun 
automatically provides a magistrate [judge] with enough 
information to approve a search of a suspect's home"). As 
a result, even assuming error,"the officers could not be 
expected to know that the magistrate judge made an 
erroneous probable cause determination" due to insufficient 
evidence connecting Hodge's house to drug dealing. Loy, 
191 F.3d at 368-69. Indeed, the magistrate judge himself 
could not know whether this Court would ultimately agree 
with his determination given the unsettled jurisprudence 
governing cases of this type. 
 
"When judgment calls of this kind are r equired," officers 
should be able to rely on the magistrate judge's 
determination of the law. Williams , 3 F.3d at 74. Here the 
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magistrate judge determined that the affidavit established 
probable cause. 
 
Hodge nonetheless seeks to defeat a finding of r easonable 
reliance by arguing that Abraham knew that the affidavit 
was insufficient. Hodge derives this argument from the 
chain of events following his arrest. After the arrest, 
Abraham and other officers drove to Hodge's home with 
Hodge's car, entered the premises, told a neighbor "that the 
car was stolen," and were told by the neighbor "that she 
had seen [Hodge] early in the morning feeding the dogs." 
Appellee's Brief at 7. Hodge argues that Abraham went to 
Hodge's home to acquire additional evidence, because 
Abraham allegedly knew that Hodge's arrest combined with 
Abraham's own opinions regarding the storage of drug- 
related evidence would be insufficient to establish probable 
cause. While at the home, the officers not only failed to 
obtain information establishing a nexus to the home, but 
learned that Hodge had not been home since early morning. 
Nevertheless, Hodge contends that Abraham applied for a 
search warrant and substituted his opinion for the missing 
factual nexus. Hodge thus suggests that Abraham knew 
that probable cause was lacking and could not r easonably 
rely on the warrant. 
 
Hodge's argument is unpersuasive. Abraham's subjective 
belief regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is irrelevant. 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the good faith 
exception requires objectively, not subjectively, reasonable 
conduct. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20 & n.20, 922 & n.23. 
Moreover, even if subjective belief wer e relevant, the fact 
that officers went to Hodge's house, or that they sought 
additional information, does not show that they knew that 
their affidavit would be deficient. Instead, the officers 
appear to have gone to Hodge's suspected residence for the 
legitimate purpose of confirming that it was indeed Hodge's 
home. 
 
Having confirmed the location of Hodge's r esidence, the 
officers properly entrusted their evidence to a magistrate 
judge to assess probable cause. See id. at 921 ("It is the 
magistrate[ judge's] responsibility to determine whether the 
officer's allegations establish probable cause . . . ."). They 
then relied on the magistrate judge's deter mination and 
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executed the search. The officers' reliance on the search 
warrant was objectively reasonable, regar dless of their 
supposed subjective belief. As a result, the good faith 
exception applies, rendering the evidence seized during the 




Because the magistrate judge had a substantial basis for 
finding probable cause, and because the officers' reliance 
on the warrant was objectively reasonable, the evidence 
seized during the search of Hodge's home is admissible. The 
order suppressing that evidence is ther efore reversed, and 
the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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